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This paper provides a case study of al Qaeda finances and funding to affiliated groups. It is based 
in large part on my observations and experience as one of five international monitors charged by 
the UN Security Council to oversee the effectiveness of the measures adopted by the Security 
Council against al Qaeda and the Taliban. Some of the material in this paper is drawn directly 
from the five reports our monitoring group made to the Security Council during my tenure..  
Considerable mystery and intrigue still surrounds the al Qaeda terrorist network and its sources of 
funding. We know more today than we did three years ago about its financial tools and structure, 
but we still have not identified much of its sources of supply and funding. And much of what we 
know may only be conjecture. The CIA has estimated, for example, that it cost Al Qaeda’ some 
$30 million a year to sustain itself during the period preceding 9/11, but the agency is still not sure 
what al Qaeda needs or expends today. And we still do not know with any precision just how 
much, and from whom, al Qaeda raises its money, or how it allocates it.[1]  
The roots of al Qaeda’s financial network, we believe, trace back directly to the extensive 
recruitment and financing networks established to support anti-Soviet jihad activities in 
Afghanistan. These networks made extensive use of Muslim charitable organizations and 
businesses around the world. As al Qaeda developed and transformed itself into an international 
terrorist movement, it established or infiltrated a series of international Muslim charities that could 
be use to collect and mask the funds it needed. These funds were used by these charities for 
both legitimate humanitarian relief and to support al Qaeda activities. This included supporting the 
establishment and maintenance of new radical Islamic centers propagating al Qaeda’s virulent 
theology and opposition to western culture and values. These centers also provided a means by 
which al Qaeda could undertake extensive, worldwide indoctrination and recruitment efforts. They 
also helped to raise, and encouraged donations for al Qaeda’s cause.  
We know also that Al Qaeda relied heavily on sympathetic financial facilitators within these 
businesses and charities, and other deep pocket donors, to obtain and channel the funds 
necessary to meet its logistical and operational requirements. The 9/11 commission report 
concluded that a core group of these financial facilitators were responsible for most of its funding. 
These facilitators obtained funds from a variety of donors, primarily in the Gulf countries and 
particularly in Saudi Arabia. “Some individual donors surely knew,” the commission report says, 
“…the ultimate destination of their donations. …These financial facilitators also appeared to rely 
heavily on certain imams at mosques who diverted zakat donations to the facilitators and 
encouraged support of radical causes.”[2]  
There is considerable less certainty with regard to other possible sources of al Qaeda funding. 
The 9/11 commission said that it had received no credible evidence to substantiate allegations 
that bin Ladin used his own funds, or that al Qaeda was funded by foreign governments, or that it 
ran its own businesses, or that it dealt in conflict diamonds or that it profited from the international 
drug trade.[3] However, many other international experts and observers believe that al Qaeda 
has drawn on such multiple sources.[4] The 9/11 Commission itself, has admitted that the lack of 
credible evidence regarding such activities might be due to a continuing lack of hard intelligence 
regarding al Qaeda finances.[5] Many experts continue to believe, as I do, that al Qaeda and its 
disparate cells will use whatever means are at hand to generate the funds they need.  
The defeat of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the elimination of al Qaeda’s bases and safe 
haven there have caused al Qaeda to splinter into scores of independent cells increasingly 
responsible for their own funding and maintenance. There are increasing indications that these 
groups have turned to small local businesses, petty crime and the drug trade to sustain 
themselves.[6]  
Several Experts, including those associated with the 9/11 Commission, believe that al Qaeda is 
now having a difficult time raising funds and that it has had to cut back significantly on its 
expenditures.[7] This presumption is based, in large part on the success the United States and 
certain other governments have had in identifying and closing down al Qaeda’s traditional 
resource base. However, there is some reason to question these assumptions. The pace of 
terrorist recruitment and activities has accelerated, not decreased, and the growth of self 
sustaining local al Qaeda cells is also increasing. There are reports also of large sums of money 
flowing into the hands of Iraqi insurgents, including Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, from Saudi Arabia and 
other Muslim states.[8] New training camps are being established in several remote areas in the 
Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa and several countries of the former Soviet Union.[9] There 
are also indications that the pace of funds being providing to radical fundamentalist teaching 
centers around the world has remained constant, or even increased.[10]  
Much of the investigation and research related to al Qaeda has dealt with its funding mechanisms 
and not with the motivation that has generated the donations and dedication that has supported it. 
A good part of this dedication comes from radical Islamic conviction and an associated absence 
of tolerance towards other ethnical or religious customs or beliefs. This stems, in part, from a 
radical expansion of fundamentalist Islam during the past four decades. It may be generated, in 
part, also by a growing resentment and alienation toward Western cultural influence in the Muslim 
world. The Stagnant Israeli-Palestinian situation and the war in Iraq have also served as 
motivations for recruitment and support of a new generation of al Qaeda related jihadists.  
Al Qaeda’s Financial Facilitators  
The 9/11 Commission pointed to a core number of financial facilitators involved in raising, moving 
and storing the money al Qaeda needs for its maintenance, logistic and operational requirements. 
They raised funds from donors primarily in the Gulf region, but also from countries round the 
world. They used bogus and legitimate charities, shell companies and legitimate businesses as 
covers. They also enabled al Qaeda to develop a substantial financial network in Southeast Asia, 
as well as funding sources in Europe, Africa and Asia..  
Several of these financial facilitators have been captured or identified, while many continue to 
remain anonymous. Some have been designated by the U.S. Treasury and the United Nations Al 
Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee. Their assets are subject to freezing orders in many 
countries, yet many remain at large and continue their financial and business operations.  
The capture of Sheikh Saiid al-Masri, Abdul Rahim Riyadh and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, 
among other top al Qaeda officials, dealt a serious blow to al Qaeda’s financial network. They 
reportedly provided names and information that have led to the identification of other facilitators 
and funding sources. Credible information and leads have also been obtained from past al Qaeda 
financial operatives such as Omar al-Faruq [11] and Jamal Ahmed Al-Fadl[12], who broke with al 
Qaeda in the mid 1990s. But, knowing the names of al Qaeda financial facilitators has not been 
enough to put them out of business. There is also some indication that al Qaeda has been able to 
replace them almost on a one to one basis, with persons or organizations still unknown. By some 
accounts al Qaeda funding is again on the increase.[13]  
Saudi Arabia has come in for heavy criticism for allowing certain identified al Qaeda financiers, 
such as Osama bin Ladin’s brother-in-law, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, and Wael Hamza Julaidan, 
both of whom were very active in raising funds for al Qaeda, to continue to conduct business 
affairs in Saudi Arabia.[14] Similarly, Youssef Nada and Idris Nasreddin, who were designated as 
Al Qaeda financiers by the by the U.S. Treasury Department and the United Nations, continue 
able to manipulate their assets from their headquarters in Campione d’Italia and Rabat, 
Morocco.[15] While Saudi Millionaire Yassin Al-Qadi has been indicted in the United States for 
funding al Qaeda through his Muwafaq charity, he continues to run his business empire from 
Switzerland and Saudi Arabia.[16]  
Charities  
Al Qaeda’s reliance on charities to raise, mask, transfer and distribute the funds it needs, has 
been put under close scrutiny by counter- intelligence and enforcement agencies around the 
world. They have put together a composite sketch of the activities of more than 50 international 
and local charities. Many of these charities are, or were associated with some of the major 
Islamic umbrella organizations headquartered in Saudi Arabia, including, but certainly not limited 
to, the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), the Benevolence International Foundation, 
the al Haramian Islamic Foundation, Blessed Relief (Muwafaq) Foundation, and the Rabita Trust. 
These organizations have branches worldwide and are, or were, engaged in activities related to 
religious, educational, social and humanitarian programs. But we now know that they were also 
used, knowingly or unwittingly, to assist in financing Al-Qaeda.  
Charity forms a very important part of Muslim law and tradition. There is a recognized religious 
duty in the Muslim world to provide a set portion of ones earnings or assets for religious or 
charitable purposes (Zakat), and otherwise to support charitable works through voluntary deeds 
or contributions (Sadaqah). In countries like Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates that have 
no established income tax system, the Zakat substitutes as the principal source of funding for 
religious, social and humanitarian organizations and activities. The funds are collected by the 
Government, or though local mosques and religious centers. Sadaqah contributions are also 
made directly to established Islamic charities. As both Zakat and Sadaqah are viewed as 
personal religious responsibilities there has traditionally been little or no government oversight of 
these activities. Donations in large measure remain anonymous.  
Al Qaeda has taken full advantage of this lack of oversight to open its own front charities and to 
solicit funds through collection boxes at mosques and Islamic centers. It has also placed 
operatives in key positions within established charities that are able to do its bidding. Funds 
raised or allocated by or for al Qaeda are co-mingled, maintained and transferred with funds 
designated for legitimate relief and developmental activities. Their ultimate use to support al 
Qaeda activities can only become known when the moneys are transferred or diverted to al 
Qaeda-related recipients.  
In 1962 the Saudi Royal family established the Muslim World League in Mecca and provided it 
funds to support the propagation of Wahhabi Islam. The Muslim World League undertook a series 
of activities to fund institutions outside of Saudi Arabia, especially in Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The organization also became active in Europe, including 
countries of the former Soviet Union and North America. Saudi public and private support for 
these activities has been estimated at over $75 billion during the last four decades.[17] Many 
experts have drawn a link between this conversion effort and the rise in appeal of al Qaeda 
throughout the Muslim world. The line from Wahhabism to Jihadism is a very thin one, and easily 
crossed religiously and intellectually. 
The International Islamic Relief Organization is another Wahhabi sponsored charity. Established 
in 1978, it has branch offices throughout the world, including 36 in Africa, 24 in Asia, 10 in Europe 
and 10 in Latin America, the Caribbean and North America. The bulk of its financial contributions 
come from private donations in Saudi Arabia. This includes a long standing endowment fund 
(Sanabil al-Khair) established to generate a stable income to finance its various activities. The 
IIRO continues to be closely associated to the Muslim World League with which it participates in 
many joint activities. Many prominent Middle East figures and financiers have supported this 
mainstream Islamic charity.[18]  
Buy, the IIRO has also been used to channel funds to al Qaeda. According to a CIA report funds 
raised through the International Islamic Relief Organization were used to support at least six Al 
Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan prior to 9/11.[19] Evidence produced in Canadian Court 
proceedings also linked the IIRO directly to groups responsible for the 1998 bombings of the 
American Embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi.[20] The former head of the IIRO office in the 
Philippines, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, was also accused of links to al Qaeda and terrorist 
activities.[21] IIRO’s current Secretary General, Dr. Adnan Khaleel Pasha, has sought to clean 
house and steer clear of any links to al Qaeda. However, the IIRO, under his direction continues 
to provide direct support to Hamas activists.[22]  
The Benevolence International Foundation is another Saudi umbrella charity organization that 
has served as an important funding source for al Qaeda. Benevolence was established in the late 
1980’s as two separate organizations. One, the Islamic Benevolence Committee was established 
as a charity based in Peshawar, Pakistan and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Its titular founder was 
Sheikh Adil Abdul Batarjee. Its sister organization, Benevolence International Corporation was set 
up as an import export business in the Philippines by Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, who also 
headed the Philippines IIRO office. Both organizations were engaged in raising funds to support 
the mujahideen in Afghanistan. The two organizations appeared to work separately until the early 
1990s. In 1992 they became the Benevolence International Foundation and opened new 
branches throughout Southeast Asia as well as in Europe and America.  
The U.S. Treasury Department took action in December 2001 to designate Benevolence 
International Foundation (BIF) as financiers of terrorism. The United States subsequently called 
upon the Security Council to add Benevolence to its consolidated list of entities associated with al 
Qaeda. The Treasury Department charged that BIF and its chief executive officer, Enaam 
Arnaout were involved in funding al Qaeda activities including “the purchase of rockets, mortars, 
rifles and offensive and defensive bombs, and …(distributing) them to various mujahideen camp’s, 
including camps operated by al Qaeda”[23] The Treasury document also cited direct links 
between Arnaout and bin Ladin, and with Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, a bin Laden lieutenant. 
Testimony at the 2001 trial of United States v. Bin Laden, et al, implicated Salim in efforts to 
develop chemical weapons for al Qaeda and to obtain nuclear weapons components.[24]  
The al Haramain Islamic Foundation, based in Jedda, is one of Saudi Arabia ’s most active 
charities in spreading Islamic fundamentalism. Al Haramain reportedly funded some 3000 
Wahhabi missionaries and concentrated heavily in establishing new Wahhabi Mosques in 
Southeast Asia, the Balkans, and Africa. Since 9/11 Al Haramain has come under close 
international scrutiny as a conduit for al Qaeda funding. According to its web site Al Haramain 
operates in some 49 countries. It raises some $30 million per year drawing its funding largely 
from Saudi donors. Its founding general manager Shiekh Aqeel al-Aqeel maintained a close 
relationship with the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, and the Saudi government was considered 
one of its principal benefactors.  
On 11 March 2002 the United States and Saudi Arabia jointly designated the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Somalia offices of Al-Haramain as al Qaeda funding sources. Al-Haramain 
Somalia had funneled money to Al-Ittihad al-Islami, a designated terrorist group, by disguising the 
funds as contributions for an orphanage project and for Islamic school and mosque 
construction.[25] The Bosnia office was linked to Al-Jemaah al-Islamiyah al-Masriyah and to 
Osama bin Laden. Further investigation also implicated branches in Albania, Croatia, Ehtiopia, 
Kenya, Kosovo, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Tanzania. The Russian government has also 
complained to Saudi Arabia regarding alleged Al Haramain funding for Chechen rebels.[26] The 
Saudi government has removed Shiekh Al-Aqeel as Al Haramain’s General Manager and ordered 
the closing of 15 branches outside Saudi Arabia.[27] Shiekh Aqeel al-Aqeel was designated by 
the U.S. Treasury in June 2004 and his name was added to the United Nations Consolidated Al 
Qaeda associate list.[28] However, it does not appear that Saudi Arabia has taken any other 
actions against him.  
The "Blessed Relief" charity, also known as the Muwafaq Foundation was established in 1991 by 
Yassim al-Qadi who was subsequently identified as an associate of Osama bin Ladin. The stated 
purpose of the charity was to “relieve disease, hunger and ignorance.” The Charity was active in 
Bosnia during the Balkan wars and was closed in 1998 following allegations of fund-raising and 
transferring of funds on behalf of al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. The foundation’s 
principal benefactor was Khalid Bin Mahfouz. Al-Qadi was subsequently designated by the U.S. 
Treasury Department on October 12, 2001.[29]  
The Rabita Trust was established in Pakistan in 1988 ostensibly to repatriate and rehabilitate 
stranded Pakistanis from Bangladesh. Its stated aims included the dissemination of Dawah 
(culture), to expound the teachings of Islam, “and to ‘defend’ Islamic causes in a manner that 
safeguards the interests and aspirations of Muslims, solves their problems, refutes false 
allegations against Islam, and repels inimical trends and dogma which the enemies of Islam seek 
to exploit in order to destroy the unity of Muslims and to sow seeds of doubt in the Muslim 
brethren.”[30] The members of the Trust included both Pakistanis and Saudis, including 
Pakistan’s Ministers of Finance and Interior as well as Saudi Prince Talal ibn Abdul Aziz, 
secretary-generals of the Muslim World League and the International Islamic Relief Organization 
and President of the Council of Saudi Chamber of Commerce. Most of its funding was secured 
from Saudi businessmen. Funds from the trust were reportedly used for a number of al Qaeda 
related activities, including recruitment and training in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere. The 
Rabita Trust was run by Wael Hamza Julaidan, who the U.S. Treasury Department charged was 
an associate of Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri. He was designated by the U.S. and the 
UN as an al Qaeda associate in late 2002.[31]  
These are but a few of the charities that al Qaeda has used to support its indoctrination, 
recruitment, and training efforts as well as its logistical maintenance and terrorist activities. The 
current status of many of these charities is unclear. Some of them continue in operation today. 
The International Islamic Relief Organization has new top leadership in Saudi Arabia. But many of 
its local chapters retain their past management and structure. Likewise branches of al-Haramian, 
despite closing orders from Saudi Arabia continue active in many countries including Somalia and 
Indonesia. Other closed charities have merely opened again under new names.  
Businesses - Supporting Al Qaeda  
There is considerable anecdotal information that al Qaeda, and its sympathizers continue to run 
businesses to support al Qaeda. Shortly after September 11, U.S. investigators looked at several 
businesses in Yemen that were implicated in funding to al Qaeda. They named the Al Hamati 
Sweet Bakeries and two honey businesses, Al Nur Honey Press Shops and Al Shifa Honey Press 
for Industry and Commerce. The Treasury Department charged that these companies knowingly 
funneled money to bin Laden as well as helped transport arms for al Qaeda. Both these 
operations are still in business.  
Besides these small business operations, Al Qaeda’s financial facilitators also make use of shell 
companies, shell banks, offshore trusts to hide their assets and to protect the identity of 
individuals, businesses, or other entities they have used to raise money for al Qaeda. There has 
been some progress in tightening up regulation and oversight of such business activities, but 
several countries continue to attract offshore business enterprises behind which al Qaeda can 
hide. These countries invite business activities by retaining a liberal “no look” policy.[32]  
During the early 1990s, Al Qaeda ran a series of international businesses out of its safe haven in 
Sudan. According to testimony given in U.S. court by Jamal Ahmed al- Fadl, many of these 
businesses were held in the name of a shell corporation established in Sudan under the name 
Wadi al-Aqiq. Other companies he spoke about included the Ladin International Company, an 
import -export concern; Taba Investment, a currency trading firm; Hijra Construction, which built 
bridges and roads; and the Themar al-Mubaraka Company, which grew sesame, peanuts and 
white corn for the group on a farm near Ed Damazin, Sudan. The 9/11 Commission report 
indicates that these al Qaeda businesses in Sudan were closed down by the Sudanese 
government when Al Qaeda was expelled in 1998. Nevertheless, little information has come to 
light concerning possible business holdings of these shell companies outside Sudan.  
In a report submitted to the United Nations Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee the 
Government of the Philippines indicated that Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, the brother-in law of 
Osama bin Laden, had established numerous businesses, corporations and charitiable 
institutions there which had served as a network to fund the Abu Sayyaf group as well as other 
extremist organizations.[33] These reportedly included the Khalifa Trading Industries, ET Dizon 
Travel Pyramid Trading, Manpower Services and Daw al-Iman al-Shafee Inc.[34] Al-Qaeda 
operative, Wali Khan Amin Shah, established several shell companies, in Malaysia, as did 
Hambali, who used a shell “import export” company, Konsojaya Trading Company to hide 
terrorism funding transactions.[35]  
In Europe, Youssef Nada and Idris Nasreddin acted as key financial facilitators to hide and move 
al Qaeda money. They had established a series of shell companies in Liechtenstein, Switzerland 
and Italy to hide and protect their transactions and their holdings. Nada and Nasreddin were able 
to use their various shell entities to continue to manage and manipulate their assets well after 
they had been designated by the United Nations Security Council and their accounts had been 
frozen. In order to circumvent the sanctions against him, Nada changed the registered name of 
two of his shell companies in Liechtenstein and used them to begin a process of liquidation of 
their holdings. Liechtenstein was unable to identify which assets were being liquidated as it had 
not required the shell company to maintain any list of its assets.[36]  
There is also an interesting nexus between businesses and the charities they have used to mask 
their terrorism related funding. These charities provided al Qaeda deep pocket donors deniability 
and protected them from charges of knowingly financing terrorist organizations. The charities also 
provided an ideal conduit to mask the transfer of these funds to al Qaeda.  
It is also not uncommon for both large and small Islamic charities to own and control their own 
businesses, and to use them as sources of unregulated funds for use as they please. We believe 
that these businesses have also been used to fund al Qaeda through their owner-charities. But, 
much of this is still speculation and little information has yet been gathered concerning this 
business-charities nexus.  
A few of charity-business networks have been identified in the course of post 9/11 investigation 
and enforcement efforts. Operation Green Quest uncovered such links in its investigation of 
Yassin al Qadi and his involvement with BMI, which stands for the Arabic Beit ul Mal, or House of 
Finance. Green Quest established that there were links between BMI and an Islamic charity 
called Mercy International. Mercy was, in turn tied with al Taqwa and was implicated in several al 
Qaeda operations including the bombing of American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.[37]  
An investigation into the activities of a number of Saudi and other Middle East businessmen 
working out of Herndon Virginia also unveiled a network of some 100 intertwined companies and 
charities charged with funding al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. This included Islamic 
educational, cultural and charitable organizations as well as for-profit businesses and investment 
firms. Most of the Islamic educational and charitable organizations were “paper” organizations 
registered at a common address but having no apparent physical structure. This network became 
known as the Safa Group.[38] The Safa Group was closely associated in the United States with 
the SAAR Foundation, a charity with branches in both Canada and the United States funded by 
Saudi Billionaire Salaeh Abdul Aziz- al Rajhi. Evidence was uncovered showing that the Safa 
Group, using the various affiliated charities and companies under its control, transferred money in 
convoluted transactions through a network of inter-related organizations designed to prevent 
investigators from tracking the ultimate recipients. Collateral evidence supported the view that 
these recipients included al Qaeda, Hamas and other associated terrorist groups.[39]  
Al Qaeda’s Other Fund Sources  
There is still good reason to look closely at the international drug trade operating out of areas in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan’s northwest territory that are still not under central government control. 
How much of this may still reach al-Qaeda is uncertain. The Taliban was known to take a large 
cut from this $6 billion drug trade. While the 9/11 Commission was dubious that any of these 
funds still reach al Qaeda, other experts maintain that a portion of these funds remain critical for 
al Qaeda’s maintenance in remote areas of Afghanistan and neighboring regions.[40] Some 
experts believe that al Qaeda’s reliance on drug money has increased as a result of the 
crackdown on charities. Admittedly, evidence linking al Qaeda directly to the drug trade is scarce. 
However, Mirwais Yasini, the head of Afghanistan's Counter Narcotics Directorate, maintains that 
the Taliban and its allies derived more than $150 million from drugs in 2003. He believes that 
there is still a “central linkage” between many of the drug traffickers, Mullah Omar and Osama bin 
Laden.[41] Drug funds are also reported key to funding al Qaeda operations in areas of the 
former Soviet Union, including Chechnya.[42]  
Since 9/11 and the United States led coalition victory in Afghanistan al Qaeda has gone through a 
new transformation. Its network structure has splintered. Al Qaeda’s shuria, or high command 
council, no longer plays a central role in soliciting funds or allocating expenditures. Rather, al 
Qaeda’s largely compartmentalized cells have become responsible for much of their own financial 
support. These local cells now operate autonomously, raising funds through local businesses, 
charities and petty crime. This has involved such activities extortion, drug and cigarette smuggling, 
credit card fraud, coupon fraud and other petty crimes.[43]  
The United Nations Monitoring Group received several reports that theft rings which help finance 
extremist groups, including al Qaeda cells, have been involved in the trafficking of identity 
documents and the pilfering of items including computers, cellular phones, passports and credit 
cards. An al Qaeda terrorist cell in Spain reportedly used stolen credit card numbers and provided 
forged credit cards for the use of al-Qaeda cells in other countries. Similar activity was also 
reported in Belgium.[44]  
The crackdown on al Qaeda financing may have led al Qaeda, even before 9/11 to transfer a 
portion of its exposed assets into untraceable precious commodities. This process reportedly 
began as early as 1998 when freezing actions were first initiated in the United States and 
European against the Taliban. This reportedly included transfers into such gold, diamonds, 
tanzanite and other precious commodities. These precious commodities are small and easy to 
store and transport. They hold their value over time. They can also be released in small quantities 
in the market without arousing attention.[45]  
Banking for Al Qaeda  
From the beginning Al Qaeda has made use of the international banking community to conduct 
many of its financial activities. Osama bin Ladin and other top leaders of al Qaeda, as well as 
many of it Al Qaeda’s financial facilitators maintained bank accounts in Europe, North America 
and other international banking centers. Since the 1998 Embassy bombings and again after the 
9/11/2001 attacks, banks have increased their vigilance concerning possible terrorist funding 
activities. Freezing orders have been placed against funds identified as belonging to al Qaeda 
and the Taliban, as well as those associated with them. Banks have also received orders to stop 
transactions related to Al Qaeda and to report all suspicious transactions to local authorities.. 
Nevertheless, there is still reason to believe that well heeled financiers, and established charities 
and businesses with links to al Qaeda, continue to use international banking facilities. They are 
adept at masking these transactions through the use of trianglarization and intermediaries.  
Al Qaeda’s facilitators have also been active in establishing their own banking networks to handle 
and hide financial transactions. Two such networks uncovered by investigators, al Barakat and al 
Taqwa, provide good examples of such activities.  
Al Barakat was founded in Mogadishu by Ahmed Nur Ali Jim’ale and established its headquarters 
in Dubai. Its principal activities include running a telecom service in Somalia and several other 
countries, a bank and a money remittance (or Hawala) system. The U.S. Treasury Department 
charged that the company skimmed fees from remittances sent by expatriate Somalis and used 
that money to finance al Qaeda terrorist activities. Al Barakaat’s hawala operation reportedly 
spread through some 40 countries. It was estimated that Al Barakaat handled some $140 million 
a year in transmitted payments. Service charges ranged from 2% to 5%. This may have 
generated revenues in the millions for al Qaeda.[46] In addition to providing revenue for al Qaeda, 
al Barakaat also provided a discrete channel for the transfer and distribution of al Qaeda 
funds.[47]  
Al Taqwa, with offices in Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Italy and the Caribbean is suspected of 
provided other important transfer and banking facilities for al Qaeda. Al Taqwa was founded by 
Youssef Nada, an Egyptian-born businessman long close to the Muslim Brotherhood. According 
to the U.S. Treasury, al Taqwa acted largely as a money laundering facility for al Qaeda and 
other Islamic terrorist groups. It also provided “indirect investment services for al Qaeda investing 
funds for bin Laden and making cash deliveries on request to the Al Qaeda organization.” 
According to one report, al Taqwa even provided a clandestine line of credit for a close associate 
of bin Ladin.[48]  
Hawala  
Hawala operations abound throughout the Middle East, Asia, the Pacific region and Latin Amercia. 
They also have well established branches in Europe and North America. Hawala has long served 
the critical function of providing for the remittance needs of guest workers, or as informal banking 
system where established banking fears to tread.  
By some estimates, hawala handles more international transactions in the Middle East Asia and 
the Pacific then the established banking system. Certainly, they service a larger client base.  
Most hawala operations are unregulated. Few records are kept and transfers are handled 
informally and, in most cases, with no real oversight. This offers al Qaeda, and those supplying it 
with money, an ideal channel for handling its money transfer requirements. Many hawalars are 
also well connected with banks in Asia and the Middle East. Their transfer accounts raise few 
questions and are employed for settlement between hawalars, hiding completely the transactions 
originator and ultimate receiver.  
Several countries have begun to crackdown on hawala operations as part of their anti money 
laundering and terrorism financing programs. But, few have had any real success in securing 
oversight over such transactions.[49]  
Using Al Qaeda Money  
We can still only speculate concerning al Qaeda’s budget and expenditures. Before 9/11 these 
funds were used in large part for logistics, training, maintenance and operations. According to the 
9/11 Commission study, al Qaeda funded salaries of jihadists, training camps, airfields, vehicles, 
arms, and the development of training manuals. Bin Ladin also provided approximately $10 
million to $20 million per year to the Taliban. Indoctrination and recruitment remained the 
responsibility primarily of Islamic fundamentalist teachers sympathetic to al Qaeda’s cause. And 
these groups had their own sources of support and funding. Al Qaeda also contributed to 
supporting the financial requirements of the Taliban regime—however the extent of this support 
remains also in the realm of conjecture. Some funds were also used to support local social, 
cultural and humanitarian programs aimed at winning a base of local support in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere.[50]  
The 9/11 Commission report tells us also that before 9/11 al Qaeda was active in establishing 
alliances with other Islamic terrorist organization. This included groups in Southeast Asia such as 
Jemaah Islamiayah and Abu Sayyaf They also developed ties with the Salafist groups of North 
Africa, and other emerging Islamist groups in several areas of the former Soviet Union. Al Qaeda 
also provided other Jihadi groups with start-up funding and funding for selective operational 
activities. Many of these groups developed common resource and funding sources with al Qaeda. 
But, they often preferred to seek outside funds from al Qaeda to pay for specific terrorist 
operations. The Commission believes that such financial support to other groups has been 
curtailed since 9/11. What remains now, their report says, appears to be based more on 
“personal relationships with operatives than on a management structure.”[51]  
Nevertheless, there is considerable anecdotal information that al Qaeda continues today to 
provide financial and logistical assistance to groups in Chechnya, North Africa, and Southeast 
Asia. According to Indonesian investigators, Al Qaeda was responsible for funding Jemaah 
Islamiayah’s Bali bombing operation as well as the August 2003 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in 
Jakarta.[52] Al Qaeda is also believed to have helped finance the establishment of terrorist 
training camps in remote areas of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand as late as 
the spring of 2003.[53] Al Qaeda also continues to retain substantial financial links with the 
Salafist Group for Call and Combat in North Africa, and is suspected of providing new financial 
support to emerging groups in both East and West Africa.[54] 
Government responses  
The fight against terrorism has benefited significantly from increased intelligence gathering in the 
wake of 9/11. This has included information gleaned from forensic banking investigations, from 
suspicious transaction reports, from seized computers and documents and from information 
obtained from captured al-Qaeda operatives or associates. This information has led to the arrest 
and closing down of several terrorist financing schemes and those responsible for them.  
Steps were taken in a number of countries to designate individuals and entities, including 
charities, which were believed implicated in al Qaeda and associated terrorism financing. Many of 
these designations were submitted to the UN Security Council for addition to the UN consolidated 
list of al Qaeda and Taliban associated individuals and entities. The Security Council also passed 
a series of resolutions imposing on all countries the obligation to freeze the assets of such 
individuals and entities and to prevent their nationals from providing them any economic 
resources. But, these measures have been too narrowly applied. First of all they pertain only to 
those 390+ individuals and entities on the UN list.[55] And, beyond that, few countries have acted 
to freeze assets other than bank accounts.[56] To date some $137 million has been reported 
frozen by banks in 30 countries Most of this money belonged to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. 
Some $59 million appeared to be associated directly with al Qaeda and those supporting it.[57]  
Many governments also put in place new regulations after 9/11 to tighten banking oversight. 
These included new “know your customer” requirements and an obligation to report all suspicious 
transactions. The United Nations, FAFT, the IMF and the World Bank have all become active in 
encouraging and assisting countries to adopt new financial regulatory measures. Most countries 
now have in place legislation or regulations authorizing them to freeze the assets of persons or 
entities designated by the Security Council as associated with al Qaeda or the Taliban, but these 
measures do not yet apply to other individuals or entities not yet included on the UN lists. In some 
countries further evidentiary requirements must also be met before such freezing actions can be 
implemented.  
Most countries have failed to take action against other tangible assets, including businesses and 
other income producing assets, in the hands of identified al Qaeda supporters. Several countries 
have indicated that they lack the means or authority to reach beyond bank accounts. Many are 
also loath to close down or take over the administration of business assets associated with 
designated persons or entities. There is also the additional problem of businesses and assets 
which are owned and administered jointly with non-designated persons. This may include family 
members.[58]  
Before 9/11, few countries regulated charities other than in relation to their tax status. A number 
of countries have acted since to impose new charity oversight procedures. Some 50 charities 
have reportedly been shut down in Gulf countries, and 40 more charities have come under official 
surveillance. Saudi Arabia has announced that it has audited 245 domestic charities and frozen 
their external offices, shutdown 12 charities and banned donation boxes at commercial stores 
and mosques. However, the names of very few of these charities have so far been submitted to 
the Security Council for designation.[59]  
Current International cooperation against terrorism financing is founded largely on a series of 
International obligations, regional agreements, and bilateral arrangements. UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1526 (2004) provide important pillars for this cooperation. The 
former directs that all countries afford one another the “greatest measure of assistance” in tracing 
down terrorists and investigating terrorist acts. It also calls on all countries to “find ways of 
intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information.” The Resolution also 
established a special Counter Terrorism Committee charged with enhancing international efforts 
to deal with terrorism. But it has not yet provided an effective platform for cooperative counter-
terrorism efforts.[60]  
Resolution 1526 (2004) also calls upon all countries to identify al Qaeda members and 
associated organizations and to provide appropriate information concerning their names and 
activities to the Security Council’s Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee so that they might 
be included in the Committee’s list of al Qaeda members and associates. This list now includes 
only 162 al Qaeda members and 103 associated entities, a very small segment of the al Qaeda 
network. But, many countries continue to feel reticent about providing the names of their nationals 
or residents to the Security Council for listing. The vast amount of persons and entities listed to 
date were provided by the United States. But what about the vast majority of al Qaeda members 
not included on this UN list? Many of them, although known in some countries, remain 
anonymous in others, and relatively free to roam and support al Qaeda activities.[61]  
Recommendations  
There are a great number of challenges ahead of us in the war on terrorism, and in halting 
funding for terrorism financing and particularly for those associated with al Qaeda. However, this 
writer believes that there are a number of things that need to be done, or done better, as we carry 
out our responsibilities to protect our citizens and our national interests.  
First, we need to focus greater attention on the funding that supports the propagation of radical 
Islam—the very foundation that al Qaeda and like-minded groups use to indoctrinate and recruit 
new adherents. We must put much greater pressure on all countries and entities that fund hate or 
religious intolerance. This should be considered as both a foreign policy and public diplomacy 
initiative.  
International cooperation in support of the war on terrorism financing is still patently inadequate. 
Most cooperation takes place on a bilateral basis. While the United States has developed some 
effective channels for working with other countries, cooperation among third countries remains 
quite limited. We need a much better forum for providing mutual support and for exchanging 
information related to terrorism financing.  
The United Nations Consolidated List of Designated Individuals and Entities remains woefully 
inadequate and out of date. This list provides the basis for freezing actions in most countries, and 
for getting them to halt possible terrorism related transactions. Yet most of the known al Qaeda 
world is still not on this UN list. It must either be rapidly expanded, or replaced by a new formula 
that requires all countries to take the appropriate action against those who finance al Qaeda 
terrorism.  
We must also find a better way to use intelligence information in freezing assets and pursuing 
criminal prosecutions. Too many known terrorist financiers continue to remain free to carry out 
their trades because of the reticence to share intelligence and other evidentiary information. 
Harsh financial and other penalties must be imposed to deter terrorist funding.  
The G-8 has put in place a Counter Terrorism Action Group with a mandate to identify and assist 
countries that lack the resources necessary to combat terrorism financing effectively. The group 
was also charged with putting greater pressure on countries that lacked the necessary political 
will. This group must take on a much higher profile of activity.  
Winning the war on terrorism financing is not impossible. But it is very difficult. New ideas must be 
tested and applied to dealing with this 21st century scourge.  
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